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ABSTRACT
Data is power in today’s society, but not all access to data is ethical or legal. When individuals or
organizations are able to access unauthorized data, they can manipulate it or profit from it. In this
article, the emphasis is on the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) grant account
holders and how their data is being used. The SASSA grant holders are vulnerable and poor,
often with no one to assist them if they do not receive their full grant pay-out. A survey was done
where 1000 questionnaires were given to helpers who visited SASSA pay-out points in Moloto
in Pretoria and Katlehong in Johannesburg, who then assisted the grant holders with completing
the questionnaire. A total of 534 completed questionnaires was then used to perform crosstabulations and Pearson Chi-square analyses. The findings include that not all grant holders are
sure of exactly the amount of money they should receive and discrepancies exist, especially in
banking charges and unauthorized debits. The age groups of 70 and older and the females tend to
receive less than their total SASSA grant pay-out more often compared to younger age groups
and males. Future research can include expanding the survey to other provinces and more rural
areas as well as to identify if there are similar trends in other countries where there are social
grant programs and grant holders who do not receive their full payments.

Keywords: Data privacy, SASSA account privacy, data security, social grant holders.
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INTRODUCTION
Data are created every day, but not all user access to the data is ethical or legal. The increase in
digital data has societal implications, especially in developing economies (Taylor, 2017), where
the gathered data can be used to the detriment of the poor. Access to large volumes of data could
increase inequality and threaten society (O'Neil, 2016). When used commercially, data is known
for its ability to acquire, archive and rapidly analyse large amounts of data using models and
algorithms (Wang, Kung, & Byrd, 2018). Data analysis has become very valuable as the
information generated can be used to identify behavior patterns of individuals and groups
(Dunlap & Dunlap, 2014). Illegal access to data cost South Africa approximately ZAR50 billion
in 2014, with the amount increasing sharply annually (Van Niekerk, 2017).

The paper will explore how the data of the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) grant
holders are used when there is access granted to their accounts. The access can result in illegal
and/or unethical behaviour. There are often differences in the amounts that SASSA grant
recipients should receive and what they actually receive, resulting in the following research
questions:


What is the link between the amount that SASSA account holders were meant to receive
and the amount they actually received?



What are the reasons for these discrepancies?

The paper will start with providing a background of the South African grant holder and provide
literature on how data can be used when obtained, followed by the research design. The findings
and discussion will look at grant holders’ accounts and look into reasons why some grant holders
do not receive their correct amounts every month and finally the paper concludes with possible
implications and future research.
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BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
The population of South Africa is approximately 55.6 million (Radebe, 2017) with almost 17
million South Africans receiving a social grant, roughly 30% of the population (Malange, 2017).
Recipients of social grants include a vulnerable segment of the population who are “too old to
work” (pensioners); “too young to work” (child support grant holders); or too “sick/disabled to
work” (disability grant holders) (Natrass, 2006). Fraudulent practices are currently moving away
from the individual into corporate profit-making, with companies accessing data showing a sharp
increase in profits (Etheridge & Van Zyl, 2017). The research will examine the prevalence of
problems experienced by SASSA grant recipients in terms of not receiving their full grant payout monthly.

LITERATURE REVIEW
There are many uses of data and one should not only look at data being stolen by imposters, but
also look at all the positive ways that data can be used to impact individuals and communities.
Often, data can be monetized or turned into profit. It would be senseless for someone to go to all
the trouble and possible prosecution and not make money from the data obtained. The next
subsection will explore what people are doing with data when it has been stolen.

How stolen data is used
Cyber criminals have realized that it is easier and less risky to steal identities than to commit
robberies (Waterson, 2017). Theft of data for resale, including identity and of intellectual
property theft, motivate illegal access to big data. It is not always easy to anticipate a cyberattack because criminal intentions vary and can include misuse of IT infrastructure to launch a
bigger attack (Weaver, 2017). One way criminals have obtained personal information used for
identity theft from SASSA beneficiaries is to send messages urging them to get new SASSA
cards before a specific deadline. Beneficiaries have been publically warned to ignore such
messages or people posing as SASSA representatives and urged to rather approach the physical
SASSA offices for help (Mabena, 2017).
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Use of legally acquired data
Companies can access big data to make business decisions that can benefit the public in general
or improve their own profits. Three examples are given below that is highlighted by Tene (2017):
1. The discovery of the adverse effects of the drug Vioxx was made possible because of data that
was collected from clinical records that linked 27 000 cardiac arrest deaths from 1999 – 2003
to the its use
2. In the retail market, Wal-Mart is enabling its suppliers to monitor their stock levels at any
Walmart store at any point in time, using the data that they provide to their suppliers.
3. Amazon has a feature called ‘Customers who bought this also bought’ which prompts users to
complete additional purchases from that site. When using the above features, companies are
able to improve their customer experiences.

Questionable outcomes from the use of data
It is recognized that data obtained from social media such as Google and Facebook is not only
used to increase advertising revenue; but also marketed to other end users who require the
information for reasons that could be detrimental to consumers or invade personal privacy
(Laguna, 2017). In South Africa, more than 17% of the population receive a social grant, with
only 7 million tax payers (Gray, 2006). Those SASSA grant recipients who buy on credit or
borrow money, have shared the hardship caused by high interest rates and fees that are paid on
loans, which leave them with little or no money from their grants. This situation is partly due to
money lenders and retail facilities failing to do an affordability check. From the National Credit
Regulator’s perspective, “It is a legal requirement for money lenders to perform an affordability
check on potential borrowers before granting a loan. A credit provider must take practicable
steps to assess the consumer or joint consumer’s discretionary income to determine whether the
consumer has the financial means and prospects to pay the proposed credit instalments”
(GroundUp, 2017). It may also be due to criminal intent, where illegally obtained data is
misused. Data can also be used to make a profit, as discussed in the next section.
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Turning data into profit
According to the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) (2017), there are two main ways that
criminals can ‘monetize’ data they steal:


They sell stolen data to other criminals that are able to exploit it. This is ‘secondary fraud’.
Criminal websites may be used to facilitate transactions. Payment is also made in cybercurrencies such as Bitcoin, which is hard to trace.



When stolen data is used to exploit bank accounts, “money mules” may launder stolen
money through various accounts until they can get ‘clean’ money into their hands.

Although cyber criminals consider this type of crime to be low risk, it is expensive because every
piece of software, hardware or individual involved must be paid or bought. Consequently, cyber
criminals aim at accessing very large datasets such as SASSA in order to obtain high value
payouts, to compensate for the small profit margins (GroundUp, 2017). In the local South
African context, the size of the SASSA database is made evident in the following quote from the
website of Cash Paymaster Services (CPS), the firm that has previously managed SASSA
payouts to beneficiaries in South Africa using the Universal Electronic Payment System
(U.E.P.S) technology:
“Our CPS business unit deploys our U.E.P.S. - Social Grant Distribution technology to
distribute social welfare grants on a monthly basis to over nine million beneficiaries in South
Africa. These social welfare grants are distributed on behalf of SASSA. During our 2012, 2011
and 2010 fiscal years, we derived 41%, 47%, and 66% of our revenues respectively, from CPS'
social welfare grant distribution business” (National Cyber Security Centre, 2017).

SASSA Grant Types and Payment Amounts
In South Africa, a SASSA card is used to receive a monthly pay-out at a designated pay point,
whereas an EasyPay cardholder receives the money in a bank account (Cash Paymaster Services,
2017). Money can be deducted from the EasyPay accounts, opening the door to fraudulent or
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illegal deductions. The types of grants paid by the South African Department of Social
Development are shown in Table 1 below:

Table 1. South Africa Social Grants in 2018 (SASSA, 2018).
Grant Name

Grant

Grant Description

Amount: 1
Apr 2018
“Social relief of distress is a temporary provision

Social relief of distress

of assistance intended for persons in such dire
material need that they are unable to meet their
or their families' most basic needs”.
Grants-in-aid

R360

“The applicant must be in receipt of a grant for
Older Persons, Disability grant or a War
Veteran's grant, and require full- time attendance
by another person owing to his/her physical or
mental disabilities”.

Child Support Grant

R400

Paid for children born after 31 December 1993.

Foster Care Grant

R920

Paid to foster parents provided there is a court
order indicating foster care status and the child is
in the care of the foster parents.

Care Dependency Grant

R1600

Paid for children under the age of 18 who have
submitted a medical / assessment report
confirming permanent, severe disability.

War Veteran's Grant

R1530

The recipient must be 60 years and over or must
be disabled and must have fought in the Second
World War or the Korean War.
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Grant Name

Grant

Grant Description

Amount: 1
Apr 2018
Disability Grant

R1600

Paid for individuals between 18 to 59 years of
age who must submit a medical / assessment
report confirming disability.

Grants for Older
Persons
- Old age (under 75 years) R1600
- Old age (over 75 years)

Recipient of the grant must be 60 years or older.

R1620

There are various regulations and laws that assist grant holders, below is a brief summary:

Laws and regulations that may influence SASSA grant accounts
The following laws and regulations may be useful for preventing fraud and data theft from
SASSA accounts:


The POPI Act on Data Privacy: The Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act deals
with “promoting the protection of personal information processed by public and private
bodies” (The Presidency, 2013).



The PAI Act on Data Privacy: The Promotion of Access to Information (PAI) Act is used
“To give effect to the constitutional right of access to any information held by the State and
any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or
protection of any rights; and to provide for matters connected therewith” (The Presidency,
2000).



The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill on Data Privacy: The Cybercrimes and
Cybersecurity Bill lists

“offences which have a bearing on cyber-crime and to prescribe

penalties; to criminalize the distribution of data messages which is harmful and to provide for
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interim protection orders; to further regulate jurisdiction in respect of cybercrimes; to further
regulate the powers to investigate cybercrimes; to further regulate aspects relating to mutual
assistance in respect of the investigation of cybercrime (The Presidency, 2016).


The Social Security Act: The Social Security Act is “to provide for the establishment of the
South African Social Security Agency as an agent for the administration and payment of
social assistance; to provide for the prospective administration and payment of social security
by the Agency and the provision of services related hereto; and to provide for matters
connected therewith” (The Presidency, 2004)



The National Credit Act: The National Credit Act is established “To promote a fair and
non-discriminatory marketplace for access to consumer credit and for that purpose to provide
for the general regulation of consumer credit and improved standards of consumer
information; to promote black economic empowerment and ownership within the consumer
credit industry; to prohibit certain unfair credit and credit-marketing practices” (The
Presidency, 2006).

The two court proceedings below have been accessed to indicate how the above laws have
previously been used to prevent cyber-crime linked to the theft of consumer data or information:


Extract from the Constitutional Court Ruling on 17 March 2017: In the court case
Black Sash Trust vs Minister of Social Development and Others, the case was brought by
Black Sash against the Minister of Social Development around the lack of resolution in
finding another provider to administer the payment of Social Grants to SASSA grant
beneficiaries. In this case, specific mention was made around the protection of SASSA
beneficiary information and having this information only being used for the payment of
the grant (Constitutional Court, 2017).



Extract from the High Court Ruling on 9 May 2017: In the court case Net1 Applied
Technologies South Africa and Others vs Chief Executive Officer of the South African
Social Security Agency and Others, the researcher has taken extracts from the court
records in order to understand how the laws have been interpreted (North Gauteng High
Court, 2017).
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In summary, the second case was brought by the Minister and Department of Social
Development and Others against Net1 and Others. The concern brought to the court was around
the interpretation of the amendments to regulations 21 and 26A of the Regulations under the
Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004, where the Minister of Social Development was seeking to stop
all electronic debits, stop orders and electronic fund transactions (EFTs) on SASSA beneficiary
accounts held at Grindrod. Essentially, the court ruled in favor of Net1 and Grindrod, saying that
the amendments “do not operate to restrict beneficiaries in the operation of their bank accounts”
therefore Net1 and Grindrod did not need to stop the debit orders on SASSA beneficiary
accounts (North Gauteng High Court, 2017). The literature review has highlighted some of the
obstacles that SASSA grant holders face in a country where data can be misused and be
detrimental to the poor’s everyday living conditions.

RESEARCH DESIGN
The problem is that if even a small portion of the social grants needed for subsistence of
vulnerable, poor and unemployed people often do not receive their full grant pay-out every
month. It is therefore essential to understand the technology behind this issue and make
recommendations to help safeguard social grants and prevent access by criminals to data/
information about vulnerable grant-holders in South Africa.

Research Methodology
During October and November 2017, 1000 questionnaires were printed. The aim was to receive
at least completed 500 questionnaires. The questionnaire was a one-page document that would be
easy to complete and only the relevant additional information was asked of the respondent. No
participants were forced to complete the questionnaire and therefore did so voluntarily. For those
participants who were unable to write, assistants helped them to complete the forms.
Questionnaires were completed by randomly selected grant holders, in total 534, who were
collecting grants at SASSA Service Centers / SASSA Pay points and Bank ATMs two locations:


Pretoria, Moloto Area, Gauteng Province



Johannesburg, Katlehong Area, Gauteng Province
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Data Analysis
The statistical data analysis was completed using IBM SPSS Statistics 24 software. Crosstabulations were used to compare data from the account owner, age and gender and the type of
account to determine whether there was a link between the amount that SASSA account holders
were meant to receive and the amount they actually received. This formed part of quantitative
research methods, which can be defined as “the numerical representation and manipulation of
observations for the purpose of describing and explaining the phenomena that those observations
reflect” (Casebeer & Verhoef, 1997). The main reasons for the use of a quantitative approach
was to analyse precise numerical data linked to the financial status of grant holder accounts
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).

Qualitative categorical data analysis was also used to identify the reasons for debit orders and
whether grant recipients received help to sort out illegal debits. Qualitative research methods
can be defined as “the non-numerical examination and interpretation of observations, for the
purpose of discovering underlying meanings and patterns of relationships” (Elo et al, 2014). The
reason for the use of qualitative research was to give the researcher more insight into the answers
provided by respondents, using their own words and context to explain themselves (McQuail &
Windahl, 2015). This research method allowed for the context to be analyzed and find common
concepts.

MAIN FINDINGS
The demographics of the SASSA grant participants are shown in Table 2:

Table 2. Demographic distribution of participants.
Participants

Frequency

Total

534

Male

184
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Participants

Frequency

Female

345

Unknown gender

5

Age groups
18 - 30

179

31 - 40

81

41 - 50

36

51 - 60

31

61 - 70

105

70+

97

Unknown

5

Types of account
EasyPay account

66

SASSA account

382

Unknown account

38

Analysis of the Survey Results
Analysis of the questionnaires showed that 193 of the 534 questionnaires respondents did not
receive their full grant and of those 193, 46 did not know why. This finding about of the
discrepancies in grant payments was in line with previously published reports. One example can
be found on the Parliamentary Monitoring Group’s website from 2016:
“Last year, of the 13 thousand plus disputes recorded and investigated 77% were resolved in the
beneficiaries’ favor. In February alone, SASSA got more than 40 thousand queries”
(Media Briefing, 2016).
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The above numbers should be understood within the context that there are about 17 million grant
recipients in the country, and even although the numbers of disputes or discrepancies seem small,
they are still a problem.

The data collected was based on the differences in the amount the respondents believed they
were meant to receive and the actual amount collected. These differences where consolidated as
percentage difference at 10% intervals. On receipt of the responses on the questionnaire, some
respondents did not know the grant amount they were meant to receive. This became apparent
when respondents noted that they were receiving more money than expected. Some respondents
were not aware of the increase in the grant amount as from 1 April 2017 and were still quoting
values from 1 October 2016. This was corrected in the results and these respondents fell under
the group with no discrepancies.

The questionnaire had 9 questions, divided into 2 sections, designed to understand whether there
were debit orders that went off on grant holder accounts. The questions were asked in order to
understand whether these debits were authorized or not. If respondents described unauthorized
debits, they were asked if they received help from the authorities. The respondents were also
asked to state their age, gender and the type of grant account they held.

The results were cross-tabulated around the differences between the grant amount they believe
they were meant to receive and the grant amount actually received.

Question: Are you the account holder?
This question was asked of respondents to see whether there was a misuse of money when grants
were collected on behalf grant recipients. Typically, parents collected the child grant on behalf of
their children or adult children collected grants for elderly parents. The results from the sample
showed that 82 of the 534 respondents were not the grant recipients, 15,64% of the sample size.
Of these 82 respondents that collect a grant on behalf of someone else, 56% of grant recipients
received their full grant amount without any deductions.
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On closer inspection of the reasons given for the amount discrepancies, 13 out of the 82
respondents did not know why there was a discrepancy but they did volunteer some possibilities
for the discrepancies for example “They say I took a loan and I didn't apply for a loan”, “They
say it's because I changed from a SASSA card to an EasyPay card”, “I bought Eskom once and
they always take R60 every month”, “The money differs every month so I accept what I get in
my card”. Only 3 respondents did not know why there were discrepancies and received help in
understanding the reason for the discrepancy. Two respondents were sent to another office to
query the amounts, while 64 of the respondents did not query it and just accepted what they
received. Of the respondents that were aware of the reasons for the discrepancy, 7 respondents
cited “bank charges” as the reason for the discrepant amount. Other respondents cited “groceries,
accounts, transport and Scorpion Legal” as reasons for the discrepancy.

Among the group of 82 respondents who were account owners and identified discrepancies 31
did not know the reason for the discrepancy. Feedback offered for the possible discrepancies
included:
“They forced me to change my account to an EasyPay account and that's when the debits
started.”
“They say I've borrowed money for Eskom.”
“They say I've borrowed their airtime.”

Only 12 of these respondents had requested help but had not received it or were still waiting for
feedback. Overall, 71 respondents did not provide reasons for the discrepancies. Feedback from
the assistants collecting the questionnaires were that some respondents were secretive about
discrepancies. Reasons provided for e discrepancies included air-time and the payment of
accounts and debts.

Analysis based on the Pearson Chi-Square test was used for the following null hypothesis
H0: No association was found to exist between whether the account belonged to the grant
recipient or the difference in amounts received by the SASSA grant holder.
H1: A significant association was found to exist.

Proceedings of the 11th Annual Pre-ICIS SIG GlobDev Workshop, San Francisco, USA, Thursday December 13, 2018

Prinsloo and Ntondini

The exploitation of SASSA grant recipients’ data

The Pearson Chi-Squared value was 0.046 which was < 0.05, therefore the null hypothesis was
rejected and it is concluded that there is a significant association between the grant amount
received and whether the grant recipient was the account holder or not, in Table 3 below.

Table 3. Significance of deductions from SASSA grants when the grant was not claimed by the
account holder.

Question: Do you have a SASSA or EasyPay account?
This question was asked to ascertain whether there was any correlation between amount
discrepancies and the type of account that the grant was paid into. This was asked because
newspapers reported that grant recipients had issues if they changed from a SASSA account to
an EasyPay account.

The total number of SASSA account holders in the sample was 420 and total number of EasyPay
account holders in the sample was 111. It was found that 73.3% of SASSA account holders had
no discrepancies, while only 37.8% of EasyPay account holders had no discrepancies. With
EasyPay accounts, 10 respondents - 9% of the sample - did not know why there were
discrepancies in grant money received; while 34 - 8% of the respondents with SASSA accounts
did not know why there were discrepancies. When respondents were aware of the reasons for
the debits, these were generally for airtime, loans and debts on SASSA accounts. This may point
to the fact that all grant account holder information is shared with Net1 companies across the
board irrespective of the type of account. The newspaper reports alluded to the issue that grant
recipients were asked to change to an EasyPay account, before they were exposed to debits. It
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was expected that no debits should go off SASSA accounts (as per the Regulations that govern
the administration of Social Grants), yet the results showed that there were debits.

Based on the Pearson Chi-Square test to measure the null hypothesis it was found that the ChiSquared value was 0.000 which was < 0.05, therefore we rejected H0 and concluded that there was
a significant association between the account used to receive the grant money and whether the
full grant amount was received or not, shown in Table 4 below.

Table 4. Significance of having a SASSA or EasyPay account.

Question: What is your gender?
This question was asked in order to understand whether there was a correlation between the
amount received and the gender of the individual collecting the grant money. It was found that
73 females and 1 male did not give a reason for the difference in the grant amount received,
however, 81.5% of males had no discrepancies in accounts, while only 58% of females had no
discrepancies. Also, 31 females - 8.9% - and 13 males - 7% - did not know why there were debits
on the grant accounts. This result does not point to there being profiling or targeting of a certain
gender.

The Pearson Chi-Squared value was 0.000, which was <0.05, therefore the H0 is rejected and it
can be concluded that there was a significant association between the gender of the grant
recipient and whether the full grant amount was received or not in Table 5.
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Table 5. Significance of gender of SASSA grant holder.

Question: What is your age range?
This question was asked to determine whether there was any targeting or correlation with the
discrepancies, based on age of the grant holder. Of the 16 respondents that had airtime debits,
nine were in the 18-30 age group. Of the 15 respondents that said the deduction was related to
payment of a loan/debt/account, 10 were in the 61-70 age group. Of the 44 respondents that did
not know why there was a discrepancy in the grant amount received, 12 were in the 18-30 age
group and all were female; while 21 were in the 70+ age group with 12 being female.
Based on the Pearson Chi-Square test used to measure the below hypothesis;
H0: No association exists between the grant recipient’s age and the difference in amounts the
SASSA grant holder received.
H1: A significant association exists.

The Chi-Squared value was 0.051, which was > 0.05, therefore we reject H1 and can conclude
that there was no significant association between the age of the grant recipient and whether the
full grant amount was received, shown in Table 6.

Table 6. Significance of age of SASSA grant holder.
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The above research findings answer the research question ‘What is the extent of the data theft in
areas where communities rely on social development grants?’ Based on the results from the
questionnaire shown in Tables 3 to 6, it appears that there is a trend where there were
discrepancies in the expected grant amount expected and received, where the account owner did
not know or understand the reason for the deduction further proves that data collected from
SASSA grant holders was being used for purposes other than just payment of their grants. This
can be construed as data theft.

DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
The grant holders that experiences problems with unauthorized debits and money not being paid
into their accounts every month, experienced mainly the following problems:
“I think it is because of bank charges”.
“The money differs every month so I accept what I get in my card”.
“It depends on the month so I'm not sure”.
“I don't know, they say my money is being saved in SASSA office”.
“Don't know, they say I've joined life insurance”.
“I don't know but they said they would deduct the interest but now I'm confused because they are
deducting the money”.
“They didn't explain to me”.
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Companies in South Africa can access SASSA grant holders’ data and profit from it. Three
examples are given below that is found in the literature:
1. 1Life, a company that sells funeral cover, have targeted especially elder grant holders with
policies and assured them that their deductions are approved by SASSA, resulting in monthly
deductions of more than the allowed 10% of the total grant (Vally, 2016).
2. Airtime for mobile phones and electricity bills are being deducted from accounts, items that
are not being sold by SASSA (Ngwenya, 2016).
3. Cellphone contracts, insurance policies and other unknown deductions are taken form SASSA
grant holders and the grant holders struggle to stop the deductions (Kgawane-Swathe, 2014).

It was also found that grant holders seldom received assistance that led to the resolution of the
issue, sometimes leaving them vulnerable to further exploitation because they needed loans to
supplement the missing income.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The main goal of this research was to ascertain whether there were discrepancies in the grant
amount that grant recipients were meant to receive and what they actually received. It was shown
that data theft was being experienced by SASSA grant holders as debit orders were being used to
deduct money from SASSA accounts without the express permission and/or knowledge of grant
holders. It was also found that the grant holders struggled to find help when a discrepancy arose.
In today’s data driven society, it is important to protect the poor from being exploited. In a
developmental sphere, more should be done to highlight the potential negative impact of data. It
is recommended that a similar study be conducted in other parts of South Africa and perhaps in
other countries where there are problems with unlawful deductions from social grants. The
findings could also be used to modify current laws and regulations to protect the data of SASSA
grant holders from theft or exploitation.
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